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Openness, Intellectual Property and
Standardization in the European ICT Sector
Carl Mair*
1. Introduction
Interoperability standards form a key part of the microeconomic infrastructure of
today’s high-technology industries.1 By facilitating compatibility between products and
systems,2 interoperability standards scaffold the growth and proliferation of networks,
both real and virtual3: they enable machine-to-machine interaction (as in the case of
protocols); permit programs to “speak” to one another (as in the case of interfaces),
and allow information exchange between different applications and platforms (as in
the case of document formats or structured data standards).4
Since networks are becoming increasingly central to the modern economy,5 the
character of the standards which underwrite them have attracted a growing amount of
attention. In particular, the eyes of lawyers, economists and policymakers have been
drawn to the way in which intellectual property rights (IPR) over interoperability
standards can result in technological bottlenecks, leading to reduced competition
* Carl Mair is a PhD researcher in law and computer science at the centre for eLaw, University of Leiden, The
Netherlands; legal researcher at Corvers Procurement Services BV; legal counsel at Dialog Semiconductor GmBh.
1. GM Peter Swann, Dept. of Trade and Indus., The Economics of Standardization: Final Report for
Standards and Technical Regulations Directorate 21 (Dec. 11, 2000), available at http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file11312.pdf.
2. Tim Simcoe, Open Standards and Intellectual Property Rights, in Open Innovation: Researching a New
Paradigm 161, 162-63 (Henry Chesbrough et al. eds., 2008).
3. A “virtual network” is “a network in which participants are linked together by their
economic complementarity and adherence to common technological standards rather than by physical interconnection.” See Richard N. Langlois, Technological Standards, Innovation, and Essential Facilities: Toward
a Schumpeterian Post-Chicago Approach, in Dynamic Competition and Public Policy: Technology, Innovation, and Antitrust Issues 193, 195 (Jerry Ellig ed., 2005).
4. For a general definition of a ‘standard’ which embraces all the above, see Paul A. David & Shane
Greenstein, The Economics of Compatibility Standards: An Introduction to Recent Research, 1 Econ. of
Innovation and New Tech. 3, 4 (1990).
5. See generally Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets
and Freedom (2006).
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and the potential for consumer harm.6 The root of this concern stems from the
uneasy reconciliation of two aspects of interoperability standards: that they should
both incorporate leading-edge technology7 as well as be generally available and
accessible for implementation. The aspects fit uncomfortably together because the
technological frontier is often occupied by intellectual property: ‘inventive’ and
‘novel’8 technological features which are attractive to standard-setting organizations
(SSOs) may be covered by IPR such as patents, which provide their holders with the
right to exclude.9 Though the European Union (EU) has recently issued a revised set
of Horizontal Guidelines,10 which aims to encourage SSOs to adopt IPR policies that
mandate licensing on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms,
a number of European stake-holders (including governments) have advocated a
further opening up of interoperability standards in the form of mandatory royaltyfree (RF) licenses.11 This tendency to require RF licensing of essential12 IPR over
interoperability standards has provoked condemnation by some powerful private
sector software vendor lobbying groups13 as well as by some traditional formal
6. See generally Mark Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard Setting Organizations, 90 Cal.
L. Rev. 1889, 1900 (2002) (“While standardization has great economic value in many markets, group
standard setting also poses some potential threats to competition”).
7. Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industry Standards, 17 Berkley Tech. L.J.
623, 649 (2002) (“Industry standards often encompass proprietary technology, including technology
already patented or the subject of pending patent applications. This is not surprising because one would
expect an industry standard to be built upon novel and nonobvious advances in technology rather than
upon whatever is available in the public domain.”).
8. For the patentability of inventions in Europe (and some other third countries) according the European
Patent Office, see European Patent Convention, arts. 52-57, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 19.
9. Deriving from the so called “property rule” of IPR. The rule relating to actual damages for
infringement of IPR is called the “liability rule.” See F. Scott Kieff, On the Economics of Patent Law and
Policy, in Patent Law and Theory: A Handbook of Contemporary Research 3, 5 (Toshiko Takenaka ed.,
2008).
10. See Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements, 2011 O.J. (C 11) 1.
11. In particular, during the consultation over the revised European Interoperability Framework, where
the European Committee for Interoperable Systems (ECIS) advocated a RF licensing regime for ‘open
standards,’ see infra note 44.
12. According to the European Telecommunications Standard Institute Rules of Procedure R. 15 (Apr.
8, 2009), “ESSENTIAL as applied to IPR means that it is not possible on technical (but not commercial)
grounds, taking into account normal technical practice and the state of the art generally available at the
time of standardization, to make, sell, lease, otherwise dispose of, repair, use or operate EQUIPMENT
or METHODS which comply with a STANDARD without infringing that IPR . . . .”, available at http://
www.etsi.org/WebSite/document/Legal/ETSI_IPR-Policy.pdf.
13. See the leaked letter from the Business Software Alliance (BSA) (composed of, inter alia, Microsoft,
Apple, Adobe) in the context of the revision of the European Interoperability Framework, http://fsfe.org/
projects/os/bsa-letter-ec.pdf (“We urge you to vigorously advocate the language be amended to include
an express endorsement of technologies made available on . . . FRAND terms, which will allow European
innovators who own patents and other . . . IP . . . to participate in standards setting . . . .”).
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SSOs.14 The critics of RF licensing argue, inter alia, that by taking the reward
component out of the IP regime, the result will be interoperability standards which are
less innovative and less widely-used than standards adopted accorded to a FRAND IPR
policy.15 Conversely, RF licensing policy supporters argue that although essential IPRholders will lose the ability to appropriate value directly from their IP under an RF regime,
they may nevertheless still benefit indirectly via harnessing the immense network effects
associated with getting technology to read onto a standard.16 In addition, RF licensing
supporters argue that an RF regime enables the fuller participation of open source software
suppliers17 in the market for implementers, which will increase competition and the uptake
of the standard.18
At least part of the debate over IPR and interoperability standards centres around which
approach to IP licensing deserves to wear the epithet, ‘open standards’—a term of art with
no fixed meaning but which carries strong political force.19 While it is not the purpose of
this essay to vindicate a definition of ‘open standards’ which is royalty-free, this essay
aims to apply pressure to one key argument of FRAND licensing supporters against RF
interoperability standards: that RF standards are necessarily less innovative than their
royalty-bearing equivalents. However, at the same time as supporting the notion that RF
standards may be as innovative as their FRAND equivalents, this essay will also highlight
14. Juan Carlos López Agüí, chairman of the Joint Presidents’ Group (JPG) of European ICT and electronics
standards bodies CEN, CENELEC and ETSI, reportedly wrote the UK cabinet in response to their new
procurement policy which mandated use of RF interoperability standards. See Mark Ballard, International
Alarm Rings over U.K. ICT Policy, Public Sector IT (May 13, 2011 3:36 PM), http://www.computerweekly.
com/blogs/public-sector/2011/05/international-alarm-rings-over.html (“The definition of ‘open standards’ . . .
used by the UK government, is on a road towards excluding standards from the majority of the most important
standards bodies . . . from being used in UK public procurement.”).
15. For example, the BSA argued against the UK government’s RF open standards definition in their new
procurement guidelines: “BSA strongly supports open standards as a driver of interoperability; but we
are deeply concerned that by seeking to define openness in a way which requires industry to give up its
intellectual property, the UK government’s new policy will inadvertently reduce choice, hinder innovation
and increase the costs of e-government.” See Andy Updegrove, Do Royalty-free Standards Stifle Innovation?,
The Standards Blog (Mar. 4, 2011, 12:23 PM), http://www.consortiuminfo.org/standardsblog/article.
php?story=20110304122357355.
16. See id.
17. Throughout this article, “open source” will be taken to refer to “free software,” as well. Technically, the
distinction between the two is that the latter utilizes only so-called “copyleft” licensing practices and must
meet the strict requirements promulgated by the Free Software Foundation (‘FSF’). See Richard Stallman, Copyleft—Pragmatic Idealism, GNU Operating System (Sept. 20, 2011, 8:15:42), http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/pragmatic.html.
18. See Updegrove, supra note 15.
19. The term “open standards” is used frequently in political discourse, but seldom defined in a consistent
way, if at all. For its use in “political” discourse, see, e.g., Neelie Kroes, former European Comm’r for
Competition Policy, Barroso Comm’n, Speech at OpenForum Europe Breakfast Seminar in Brussels: Being
Open About Standards (June 10, 2008), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=
SPEECH/08/317&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
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their increased vulnerability to patent litigation from companies excluded by a royalty-free
IPR licensing policy, such as pure IP companies. This essay will conclude that ‘openness’
comes at a cost and that stake-holders must be prepared to fight both strategically in terms
of IP management and perhaps also on a policy-level for changes to the patent system
generally.
These arguments will be structured in the following framework. Part 2 will begin by
providing a brief background to the issues, including a short summary of the positions
of SSOs, Member State public procurers, and the open source software community. Part
3 will then attempt to show how SSOs with an RF IPR licensing policy can still attract
participants, including significant holders of relevant IP, in order to produce innovative
standards. Part 4 will outline the risks associated with a RF IPR policy, focusing mainly
on the challenges brought about by decreased participation in standard-setting. Part 5
will briefly outline some potential remedies to these challenges, as well as some policy
considerations. Part 6 will conclude.
2. Background
From a competition policy perspective, an interoperability standard is simply a
technological feature—or set of features—which competitors have agreed to not compete
on in order to share in the “network effects”20 and economies of scale associated with
the existence of a single dominant standard.21 The benefits of a single dominant standard
accrue on both the demand and supply sides simultaneously22: software suppliers reduce
costs by focusing their production on a single platform23; meanwhile, consumers benefit
“from a large installed base that generates lots of software and other complementary goods
and services.”24 While fragmented standards have been shown to retard innovation,25
20. These effects are divided into two categories: “direct” and “indirect.” Direct network effects are
predominantly a feature of real networks, and occur when users are identified with components, and simply
means that the utility any adopter derives from a network is an increasing function of the number of adopters.
Indirect network effects are simply the positive effects which the development of the downstream markets
for complementary products (and services) have on the upstream technical platform. See generally Nicolas
Economides, Competition Policy in Network Industries: An Introduction, in The New Economy and Beyond:
Past, Present and Future 96 (Dennis W. Jansen ed., 2006).
21. According to Tom Cottrell, the Japanese computer software industry’s failure to settle on a single standard
(as compared to the dominant “Wintel” standard of the US and Europe) contributed towards its slow pace of
innovation in the 1980s-1990s. See Tom Cottrell, Fragmented Standards and the Development of Japan’s Microcomputer Software Industry, 23 Res. Pol’y 143 (1994).
22. See Langlois, supra note 3, at 37.
23. According to Annabelle Gawer (quoting West), a “platform is an architecture of related standards . . . .”
See Annabelle Gawer, Towards a General Theory of Technological Platforms 13 (2010) (unpublished paper),
available at http://www2.druid.dk/conferences/viewpaper.php?id=501981&cf=43.
24. See Langlois, supra note 3, at 37.
25. See the already mentioned example of the Japanese software industry in 1980s-1990s. See generally Cottrell, supra note 21.
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cooperatively-set interoperability standards are key innovation-enablers in today’s hightechnology industries by, inter alia, giving companies’ R&D expenditures an important
degree of certainty in what is otherwise a highly uncertain and dynamic world.26
Given their pivotal role as technological infrastructure, interoperability standards have
the potential to become innovation choke points if IPR over them are abused in order to
exclude competitors or to charge “excessive prices.” To this end, both SSOs and public
sector procurers aim to regulate the exercise of IPRs in some way. SSOs do this by
requiring their members to sign up to their IPR policies. These policies usually include
a duty to declare ex ante during standard formation any essential IPR over a standard as
well as either mandating or requesting commitments on how the IPR will be exercised ex
post in the market.
2.1 Formal and Informal SSOs IPR Policies
In the case of formal SSOs, these commitments usually entail FRAND licensing of
essential IPR, which may either be binding27 or simply a request to do so.28 Formal SSOs
have publically repudiated the notion that standards should be mandatorily licensed on
a royalty-free basis.29 The Global Standards Collaboration (GSC)—an international
body comprised of the major SSOs from all over the world30—adopted a resolution
(Resolution GSC-13/22) condemning mandatory RF IPR licensing31. The GSC observed,
“[T]hat there is a trend in some user communities and some standards development
organizations in support of patent policies which enforce compensation-free provisions
for standards implementers with respect to SSO IPR policies.”32 The GSC then resolved
to: strongly voice their opposition to policies that mandate compensation-free licensing
provisions33
In contrast to formal SSOs, informal SSOs such as fora and consortia, however—and
mainly in the context of the Web and the Internet—tend to adopt either non-proprietary
26. See Swann, supra note 1, at 21.
27. For example, VITA (VMEbus International Trade Association) has a mandatory (F)RAND IPR policy
combined with compulsory essential patent disclosures. See Disclosure and Licensing of Patents in Standards,
VITA, http://www.vita.com/home/VSO/Disclosure2011.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2012).
28. ETSI ‘encourages’ FRAND licensing of essential IPR. See ETSI Guide on IPRs, Sec, 2.1.1 (Jan. 25,
2007), available at http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/document/Legal/ETSI_Guide_on_IPRs.pdf, section 2.1.1
(“Members are encouraged to make general IPR undertakings/declarations that they will make licenses
available for all their IPRs under FRAND terms and conditions related to a specific standardization area and
then, as soon as feasible, provide (or refine) detailed disclosures.”).
29. ETSI, Resolution GSC-13/22, 23-25, (IPRWG) Intellectual Property Rights Policy (Revised) (Sept. 2008),
available at http://tinyurl.com/cnuwhox.
30. Including most of the national standardization bodies from Asia, North America, and the EU.
31. See ETSI, supra note 29.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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standards or standards adopted according to policies mandating RF licensing.34 According
to Tim Berners-Lee, the current head of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), and
inventor of the Web:
Open, royalty-free standards that are easy to use create the diverse richness
of Web sites . . . . Openness also means you can build your own Web site
or company without anyone’s approval. When the Web began, I did not
have to obtain permission or pay royalties to use the Internet’s own open
standards, such as the well-known transmission control protocol and internet
protocol (TCP/IP). Similarly, the Web Consortium’s royalty-free patent
policy says that the companies, universities and individuals who contribute
to the development of a standard must agree they will not charge royalties to
anyone who may use the standard.35
2.2. Member State Public Procurement IPR Policies
In the context of public procurement, Member States often also set criteria for what
standards can be accepted as part of the software they procure. Increasingly, Member States
are opting for standards which are licensed on a RF basis, as the recent highly controversial
example of the United Kingdom procurement policy demonstrates.36
The reasons for Member States to adopt RF IPR licensing policies with respect to the
standards implemented in the software they procure generally relate to the following
concerns:
Government assets should be interoperable and open for re-use in order
to maximise return on investment, avoid technological lock-in, reduce
operational risk in ICT projects and provide responsive services for citizens
and businesses.37
34. See Worldwide Web Consortium (W3C), W3C Patent Policy (Feb. 5, 2004), http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-Policy-20040205/; see also Network Working Group, Intellectual Property Rights in IETF Technology (Mar. 2005), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3979.txt.
35. See Tim Berners-Lee (head of W3C and inventor of the Web), Long Live the Web: A Call for Continued Open Standards and Neutrality, Sci. Am. (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.
cfm?id=long-live-the-web.
36. See U.K. Cabinet, Procurement Policy Note, Use of Open Standards When Specifying ICT Requirements,
Action Note 3/11 31 (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/PPN%20
3_11%20Open%20Standards.pdf. However, this policy has since been retracted, and a public consultation on
the definition of ‘open standards’ is currently underway. See U.K. Cabinet, Procurement Policy Note, Open
Standards When Specifying IP, Information Note 09/11 (Nov. 30, 2011), available at http://www.cabinetoffice.
gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/20111130_PPN%2009_11%20Open%20Standards.pdf.
37. See U.K. Cabinet, Procurement Policy Note, Use of Open Standards When Specifying ICT Requirements,
supra note 36, at background point 4.
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The three most important goals are interoperability (in the sense of data exchange
between citizens, businesses and other government departments); re-use (i.e. that the
standard will continue to be supported in the future); and the avoidance of lock-in (i.e.
that there are a diversity of software suppliers able to implement the standard).38 The last
issue of lock-in has been one of real concern for Member State government departments
who have often found themselves unable to switch from their current (usually Microsoftbased) information systems to competing systems (often open source), due to lack of
interoperability.39 Indeed, many Member State procurement policies expressly mention that
royalty-free “open standards” are required in order to permit open source software suppliers
to make use of them as well.40
2.3 Interoperability Standards and Open Source Software Implementation
The inability of some41 open source software to implement royalty-bearing
interoperability standards derives from restrictive licensing terms in certain open source
licenses. In particular, the GNU General Public License (GPL) family of licenses are
incompatible with any royalty-bearing conditions which attach to interoperability standards.
The specific clause is found at section 7 of the GPL v2, and has been nick-named, the
“Liberty or Death clause.”42 For good reason: any extra restrictions such as patent royalties
which prevent users from exercising the freedoms in the license remove the right to
continued distribution of the software.43
38. Id.
39. As in the case of the German foreign office, which was “forced” after some experimentation with
some open source software providers, to revert back to Microsoft due to “interoperability problems.”
See Gijs Hillenius, DE: Interoperability Forces Foreign Office to Proprietary Desktop, European Commission J oinup (May 11, 2011), http://www.osor.eu/news/de-interoperability-forces-foreign-office-toproprietary-desktop.
40. See Ministry of Econ. Affairs, The Netherlands in Open Connection: An Action Plan for the Use of
Open Standards and Open Source Software in the Public and Semi-Public Sectors 6, (Nov. 2007), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/ostp/opengov_inbox/nl-in-open-connection.pdf.
41. Not all. For example, the permissive BSD and MIT licenses would have no such conflict.
42. See Richard Stallman, President of Free Software Foundation, Address at the 2nd International
GPLv3 Conference, Presentation Section: The “Liberty or Death” Clause, the Main Change from v1
to v2 (Apr. 21, 2006), available at http://fsfe.org/projects/gplv3/fisl-rms-transcript.en.html#liberty-ordeath.
43. Section 7, GNU General Public License v2.0, GNU Operating System (June 1991), http://www.gnu.
org/licenses/gpl-2.0.html. (“If, as a consequence of a court judgment or allegation of patent infringement
or for any other reason (not limited to patent issues), conditions are imposed on you . . . they do not
excuse you from the conditions of this License. If you cannot distribute so as to satisfy simultaneously
your obligations under this License and any other pertinent obligations, then as a consequence you
may not distribute the Program at all. For example, if a patent license would not permit royalty-free
redistribution of the Program by all those who receive copies directly or indirectly through you, then the
only way you could satisfy both it and this License would be to refrain entirely from distribution of the
Program.”).
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The GPL-style family of licenses covers around 65% of all open source projects
currently on the market.44 Furthermore, if we review the main types of software packages—
both proprietary and open source—available on the market, often the main rival to the
commercial software product is an open source product covered by a GPL-style license.45
For instance, the main alternatives to the dominant MS Office suite are the two office
suites, OpenOffice.org46 and LibreOffice (covered by the LGPL v3).47 One of the main
alternatives (in terms of market share48) to the dominant Microsoft Windows PC operating
system is Linux (covered by GPL v2). Likewise MySQL (covered by the GPL) is a popular
open source database which competes with Oracle’s commercial offering.49
3. RF Interoperability Standards and Innovation
Although the open source community has been among the most vocal supporters of RF
interoperability standards, strong supporters also exist among traditional ICT companies.
In particular the European Committee for Interoperable Systems (ECIS) is composed of
members ‘such as IBM, Oracle and Nokia, [and] are among the most innovative information
and communications technology (ICT) companies on the planet and include owners of some
of the largest patent portfolios in the ICT sector’.50 During the consultation for the revised
European Interoperability Framework51 v2, the ECIS supported an open standards definition
which included an RF IPR policy: “to be fully open, a software interoperability specification
may not be encumbered with running intellectual property (‘IPR’) royalties.”52
Admittedly, some of the companies which make up the ECIS rely on peripheral
services associated with open source software as a lucrative revenue stream.53 However,
44. Although the percentage of open source projects licensed under the GPL-family of licenses is apparently in
the decline, it still covers around 65% of such projects. See Matthew Broersma, Study: GPL Loses Ground in
Open Source Development, ZDNet Asia (July 2, 2009), http://www.zdnetasia.com/study-gpl-loses-ground-inopen-source-development-62055659.htm.
45. Rishab A. Ghosh, Open Standards and Interoperability Report: An Economic Basis for Open Standards
8-9, FLOSSPOLS, (Dec. 2005), http://wenku.baidu.com/view/08c7ee8a84868762caaed5c4.html?from=related.
46. However, it should be noted that Openoffice.org’s recent transfer from Oracle to the Apache Foundation
may mean the next release will be under the Apache 2 license rather than the LGPL.
47. See LGPL License, LibreOffice, http://www.libreoffice.org/.
48. See Desktop Operating System Market Share, NetMarketShare (Feb. 2012), http://marketshare.hitslink.
com/operating-system-market-share.aspx?qprid=8&qpcustomd=0.
49. I.e., Oracle pursues an “open core” model in relation to MySQL.
50. See ECIS Statement on the Proposed New European Interoperability Framework, European Committee
for Interoperable Systems [ECIS] (Oct. 13, 2010),
http://ecis.eu/documents/ECISStatementreEIF13.10.10.pdf.
51. The purpose of the (non-binding) EIF is to provide an ‘overarching set of policies, standards and guidelines which describe the way in which organizations have agreed, or should agree, to do business with each
other’ under the heading of eGovernment.
52. See ECIS, supra note 50.
53. For instance IBM receives around $2 billion annually from open source related revenue. See Benkler, supra note 5, at 47-48.

IP THEORY

Volume 2: Issue 2

59

many do not.54 What incentives do these companies have to contribute technology to RF
standards? Before this question can be properly answered, it is important to distinguish
between categories of potential participants in standard-setting, each of whom have different
incentives.
3.1 Participants in Standard-Setting
This essay follows Damien Geradin’s identification of three main participants in
standard-setting.55 These are pure IP companies, vertically-integrated companies and pure
downstream companies (standard implementers). Pure IP companies do not engage in
manufacturing (of either hardware or software), but merely produce IP which is licensed to
produce revenues. Vertically-integrated companies engage in R&D yielding IP, as well as
manufacturing downstream products making use of IP. Pure downstream companies only
produce the final product, which may implement the IP produced by both pure IP companies
and vertically-integrated companies.56
In a standards context where the IPR licensing policy is undefined, a verticallyintegrated company has incentives to get its IP to read onto standards for two reasons.
First, in order to tap into the potentially lucrative revenue streams of IP licensing from
other companies making use of its IP. Second, by getting its IP to read onto a standard,
a vertically-integrated company can raise the relative costs of implementation for its
competitors in the downstream market for implementation. Even in the case where a
vertically-integrated company fails to get its IP included in the eventual standard, it can still
lower its implementation costs vis-à-vis pure downstream companies by concluding crosslicenses with other vertically-integrated companies which were successful in getting their IP
included.57
Pure IP companies on the other hand would seem to only have incentives to get their
IP included in a standard in so far as they can monetize that IP directly into licensing
fees, although there may also be some weaker incentives to benefit indirectly through
complementary assets not essential to the standard.58 Unlike vertically-integrated companies,
a pure IP company would not be interested in cross-licensing.59 The special threat that these
companies present to RF interoperability standards will be assessed in section 4.1.

54. For example, Nokia and Oracle.
55. See generally Damien Geradin, What’s Wrong with Royalties in High-Technology Industries?, in Competition Policy and Patent Law under Uncertainty: Regulating Innovation 462 (Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D.
Wright eds., 2011).
56. See id. at 466-70.
57. Id. at 472.
58 . See generally David J, Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 Res. Pol’y 285 (June 1986), available at http://www.mbs.edu/home/jgans/tech/Teece-1986.pdf.
59. See Geradin, supra note 55, at 469.

60

IP THEORY

Volume 2: Issue 2

Pure downstream companies which do not have any IP clearly have incentives to lower
their standard implementation costs as much as possible in order to maximize their final
product margins, in so far as this drive does not affect the technological quality to the
extent consumers are put off.60
In the following assessment of the incentives for participation in royalty-free standardsetting, it is important to keep these categories of participants in mind.
3.2 Fast Adoption Rates and Network Effects
One obvious advantage of RF standards from the point of view of a technology
contributor is fast adoption rates. All things being equal, zero licensing fees over a
standard encourage that standard’s adoption by pure downstream companies, and thus
increases its foothold in a market vis-à-vis competing standards. If the vertically-integrated
company owning the IP already has a downstream product on the market, then it can
expect its market share to increase due to first-mover advantages and the natural monopoly
characteristics and network effects often associated with standards.61 As Andy Updegrove
has argued, these network effects:
[A]re so enormous that having even a slight advantage or head start, such
as having your technology rather than a competitor’s included in a new
standard, can greatly outweigh any royalties that might have been obtained
under the old regime. Companies are therefore quite happy to compete to
get their technology included for free.62
Clearly this model of indirect appropriation of the value from essential IPR requires that
the company contributing the technology is also a manufacturer of downstream products.
This argument would not apply to pure IP companies.
3.3 Strategic Considerations
Probabilistically it is clear that vertically-integrated companies with larger patent
portfolios63 in the relevant field of standardization may have relatively less incentive to
participate in RF licensing since they have a higher chance of getting essential IPR reading
60. Clearly there is a compromise between quality and price such that consumers still demand leading-edge
technology, but are not always willing to pay top dollar. The concept is that pure downstream companies wish
to pay as little for implementation as they can get away with in the market conditions.
61. A “first mover” in the literature analysing the ‘increasing returns to scale’ is W. Brian Arthur. See generally W. Brian Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy (1994).
62. See Updegrove, supra note 15.
63. Overwhelmingly, the size of a company’s patent portfolio is proportional to the size of the company. See
K. Blind et al., Interaction between Standardisation and Intellectual Property Rights, Inst. for Prospective
Technological Stud. 67 (2004), available at http://ftp.jrc.es/EURdoc/eur21074en.pdf.
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onto the eventual standard and benefitting from the resulting licensing revenue stream or
cross-licensing agreements (and vice-versa for companies with smaller patent portfolios).
However, even large vertically-integrated companies may place a significant weight on
using an unencumbered standard, particularly if the standard relevant area of technology
has a high concentration of pure IP companies, who are uninterested in cross-licensing,
and thus raise implementation costs for all implementers (whether vertically-integrated or
pure implementers). If the weight placed by companies participating in an SSO on having
an unencumbered standard is significant, then the tendency would be to drive standards
towards non-proprietary technology in the technical committee phase of standard-setting. In
an SSO with open participation, the “collective will” is most likely to lead to this outcome
where, all things equal,64 among IP contributors: pure IP companies outnumber verticallyintegrated companies; and among, implementers: pure implementers outnumber verticallyintegrated companies; and where the sum of all implementers is greater than the sum of
all IP contributors. Whether the software sector conforms to this structure is an empirical
question, but at least one study65 points to the high potential, if not yet reality, of SMEs—
which are usually pure implementers—to attain significant concentrations in this sector.
According to Trond Undheim, director of Standards Strategy and Policy at the Oracle
Corporation, participants in FRAND-based SSOs in the ICT sector largely push for, and
adopt, unencumbered or royalty-free technologies as the final standard:
The interesting thing is that, notwithstanding the fact that the
overwhelming number of ICT standards are still created in standards
development organizations that allow royalties to be charged, very few
standards are ever released that do, in fact, require the payment of royalties—
even though those that have developed them often do own patents that would
be “necessarily infringed” by a product built to their standards.66
If Undheim is accurate in his assessment, this demonstrates that there are forces at
work—even if this essay has incorrectly identified them—which drive IP holders to
contribute to royalty-free standardization even where their IP could potentially yield
licensing fees. In other words, innovators (excluding, of course, pure IP companies)
voluntarily choose to compete on implementation as opposed to attempting to capture the
standard.
This state of affairs would seem to suggest that direct IPR compensation in the form of
FRAND licensing fees may well be assessed by rational companies as less lucrative than
64. “Ceteris paribus” here may be an unreasonable assumption since different technologies are more or less
appropriate for standards. Indeed, some SSOs allow exceptional technology to be adopted as part of a standard
even without any licensing commitments at all, e.g., ETSI and IETF.
65. See Ghosh, supra note 45, at 9.
66. See Trond Undheim, Portugal’s New Interoperability Law, Oracle—Trond’s Opening Standard (Apr. 13,
2011), http://blogs.oracle.com/trond/entry/portugals_new_interoperability.
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harnessing the network effects of wide RF standard implementation in the downstream
market. The existence of these incentives may go some way to ensure that the quality of
technology contributed to the standard is of the same value as that contributed to a traditional
FRAND licensing regime.
3.4 Mandatory RF Licensing in Practice
Few formal European and international SSOs contain mandatory RF IPR licensing
provisions, though many explicitly provide for the possibility of RF licensing.67 The greatest
concentration of those that do mandate RF IPR licensing is found in the software sector.
In particular, standards relating to the Web and the Internet are almost without exception
licensed on an RF basis.68 By and large, this is due to the RF IPR policy of the W3C, which
creates standards for the Web, and the “preference”69 for non-proprietary and RF technologies
of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), which creates standards for the Internet backbone. Outside of the context of the Web and the Internet, RF standards for stand-alone clientside software are less common, though still present. For example, the Organization for the
Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) has an RF IPR policy “track,”
under which the Open Document Format (ODF) was adopted (now an ISO standard70).
Microsoft has also adopted an arguably71 “open” RF document format, Open Office XML
(OOXML).
Given that this essay aims to assess IPR policies in relation to the ICT sector as a whole,
the question arises whether there is an important distinction to be made between Web
standards and client-side software standards. It is submitted that the distinction between the
two, though easy to support only a few years ago, is of less relevance today. The exponential
growth of Web-enabled devices72 and the advent of cloud computing which permits Web
applications to take over most of the functionality of client-side stand-alone software73, is
67. See ETSI, Resolution GSC-13/24, (IPRWG) Intellectual Property Rights Policy (Revised), (Sep. 2008).
(The GSC-13/24 definition of “open standards” explicitly provides for RF licensing: “The standard is subject
to RAND/FRAND Intellectual Property Right (IPR) policies which do not mandate, but may permit, at the
option of the IPR holder, licensing essential intellectual property without compensation.”).
68. Some key and recognizable examples are: HTML, CSS, XML, TCP/IP, etc.
69. See IETF IPR Policy, supra note 34.
70. International Organization for Standardization, ISO/IEC 26300 – Information Technology – Open Document Format for Office Applications, http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.
htm?csnumber=43485.
71. RedHat, and a number of other open source companies, argue that OOXML “is not fully implementable by
non-Microsoft vendors or partners.” See Red Hat’s Position on OOXML and Open Standards, Red Hat, http://
www.redhat.com/f/pdf/RedHatOOXMLPosition.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
72. In 2008 the number of web-enabled devices exceeded the population of humans on earth. By 2050, Cisco
projects that this number will reach fifty billion. Dave Evans, Infographic: The Internet of Things, The Platform
(July 15, 2011, 9:00PM), http://blogs.cisco.com/wp-content/uploads/internet_of_things_infographic_3final.jpg.
73. There are many examples of this phenomenon, including Google Docs (for Word Processing); and Spotify
and Grooveshark (for music playing applications).
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making the very notion of “stand-alone” computing a thing of the past. This is particularly
visible in relation to codecs,74 the software devices responsible for encoding and decoding
digital audio-visual information. Traditionally, such standards have been licensed on
FRAND terms. The MPEG format for example, and which the software vendor’s lobbying
group, the Business Software Alliance (BSA), cites75 as a successful FRAND standard, is
ubiquitous in the ICT sector in both client-side applications and on the Web. However,
this situation seems to be changing. The Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG), the ISO
Working Group responsible for digital audio-visual compression codecs, such as MPEG
and variants, announced in January 2011 that it envisages the next generation standard to be
adopted under the ISO/IEC “type 1 licensing model,” which is royalty-free.76 It is plausible
that this change in tact is a response to Google’s development of a new royalty-free audiovisual compression codec, called WebM (V8), which Google and others77 intends as an
alternative to the MPEG-4 AVC (H264) codec.78 In addition to demonstrating a shift towards
RF licensing with respect to codecs, this example also shows the effect Web standards are
starting to have on the licensing practices on the client-side. In short, the interpenetration
of the Web and client-side software may be leading to a shift in the traditional “control”
approach of the client-side towards the more “open culture”79 and RF licensing models of
the Web.
4. Risks Faced by RF Interoperability Standards
In practice, however, even an RF IPR policy might not be enough to guarantee an
unencumbered standard. SSOs such as the W3C also make use of provisions granting
conditional reciprocal patent licenses, otherwise known as “non-assertion clauses” (NACs).
These provisions work to solve a possible prisoner’s dilemma besetting patents in standards:
that essential IPR-holders (from either inside or outside the formal/informal SSO) over a
standard may decide to enforce their patents in any case. NACs demand that essential IPRholders over an RF standard grant all other essential IPR-holders free use of their IP on
condition of mutual non-assertion.80 These provisions aim to nudge participants towards the
cooperation/cooperation equilibrium of patent non-assertion as opposed to the defection/
defection equilibrium of a potential all-out patent war. Such provisions however are only
effective if essential IPR-holders actually practice in the industry (are vertically-integrated).
74. See, e.g., Codec, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codec (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
75. See BSA Letter, supra note 12, at 2.
76. See Press Release, Int’l Org. for Standardisation, MPEG Envisages Royalty-free MPEG Video Coding Standard (Jan. 28, 2011), available at http://mpeg.chiariglione.org/meetings/daegu11/daegu_press.htm.
77. Supporters of WebM include Mozilla Firefox, ARM, ORACLE, AMD, etc.
78. See H.264/MPEG-4, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/H.264/MPEG-4_AVC (last visited Mar. 13,
2012).
79. See Andrew L. Russell, The W3C and its Patent Policy Controversy:
A Case Study of Authority and Legitimacy in Internet Governance 18-20 (2003), http://www.arussell.org/
papers/alr-tprc2003.pdf.
80. I.e., NACs have arguably a function like a de facto patent pool.
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It does not protect against the threat of “patent trolls”81 (also known as Non-Practising
Entities (NPE)), or legitimate pure IP companies. For example, the Bluetooth Special
Interest Group (Bluetooth SIG) is a consortium which licenses essential IPR over Bluetooth
technology to all members on an RF basis, provided the member grants a reciprocal license
for any essential IPR it may have over the standard.82 However, the enticement of an NAC
has not prevented the Washington Research Foundation,83 a third party to the consortium
and a pure IP company, from asserting its patents across the industry. This case serves as an
important reminder that the “openness” of standards is always under threat, regardless of
the character of ex ante IPR policies, even if those policies mandate royalty-free licensing.
Indeed, RF standards may well be even more vulnerable to third party patent
infringement claims than if they were adopted under FRAND licensing conditions.
4.1 The Challenge of IP Companies and Patent Trolls to RF Standards
One unfortunate side effect of interoperability standards adopted according to a RF
IPR licensing policy is that it may exclude pure IP companies from participating in
standardization as well as some large vertically-integrated companies.
As already explained, pure IP companies follow a business model where licensing
fees are the only revenue source. Situations can be imagined where such companies
may nevertheless choose to contribute IP to an RF standard—as in where they expect to
appropriate value indirectly from licensing complementary assets—but these incentives
would be comparatively weak.84 The majority of pure IP companies would have little
incentives to engage in RF standard-setting. By not participating in SSOs, pure IP
companies would not be bound by the IPR policies which usually mandate, inter alia, the
ex ante disclosure of essential IPR over a standard. In comparison, pure IP companies
would have incentives85 to join SSOs with a FRAND IPR licensing policy and so would be
bound by both the duty of disclosure as well as the duty not to charge excessive fees.86 At
81. A possible difference between a pure IP company and a patent troll (if we care to make the distinction)
is that pure IP companies actually invest in R&D, while patent trolls tend just to acquire patents in company
buy-outs or bankruptcy proceedings.
82. For details of Bluetooth SIG’s IPR policy, see Examine the SIG Membership Agreements, Bluetooth®
Special Interest Group (2012), https://www.bluetooth.org/apps/content/?doc_id=44514.
83. See Background, Washington Research Foundation, http://www.wrfseattle.org/about/ (last visited Mar.
13, 2012).
84. The uncertainty of these benefits might not make the overall participation worthwhile.
85. However, some commentators have suggested that companies which get a significant proportion of their
revenue from licensing tend to stay away from standardization altogether. See generally Knut Blind, The Influence of Companies’ Patenting Motives on their Standardization Strategies, in Proceedings, 13th EURAS
Workshop on Standardization 19 (2008).
86. As determined by the so-called United Brands test under EU competition law. See Case 27/76, United
Brands v. Comm’n of European Cmty., 1978 E.C.R. 207.
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the very least, the existence of RF SSOs may lead to the development of multiple competing
standards.87 More dangerously, though, third party IP companies (both pure and verticallyintegrated) may choose to enforce their patents generally against implementers and users
after the standard has been adopted.
This risk is non-trivial since the SSO technical committee would not have had the
opportunity to “design around” the IP of IP companies in a royalty-free standard.88 The risk
is far from academic: in 2002, after the “royalty-free” JPEG was already a well-established
image-compression standard, a company called Forgent Networks started enforcing a
claimed patent right over technology essential to the standard.89 Before being declared invalid
in 2006, the patent had already been asserted against more than thirty companies, raking in in
excess of $105 million in licensing fees.90
Admittedly, the RF standards which underwrite the Web and the Internet have so far
escaped much patent litigation.91 However, the technologies adopted as standards by the W3C
and the IETF are highly specialized, pioneering, and relate mainly to the deep infrastructure
of the Internet and Web. In contrast, interoperability standards such as, inter alia, document
formats, structured data standards and compression codecs are the subject of independent
R&D efforts by a number of private companies.92 For this reason, companies implementing
royalty-free standards covering these areas are at higher risk of ex post patent litigation.
Furthermore, recent years have seen a marked proliferation of pure IP companies93 as well as
a general increase in patenting worldwide.94 These factors suggest that the risk is growing.
87. See Anne Layne-Farrar et al., Payments and Participation: The Incentives to Join
Cooperative Standard Setting Efforts 32, (July 29, 2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/patentstandardsworkshop/00034-80123.pdf.
88. Of course, participants to an SSO adopting a royalty-free standard have incentives to search for any thirdparty patents in order to avoid the situation described. However, given the extremely large number of patents
in existence, this task can never be exhaustive, and SSOs strongly depend on the duty of disclosure of their
members. Importantly, even members to an SSO often only have a duty to perform a “good faith” or “reasonable” patent search in recognition of the heavy burden involved.
89. Priscilla Caplan, Patents and Open Standards, at 2-3 (Nat’l Info. Standards Org. White Paper, Oct. 2003),
http://www.niso.org/publications/white_papers/Patents_Caplan.pdf.
90. See JPEG—Patent Issues, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JPEG#Patent_issues (last visited Mar.
13, 2012).
91. The author is not aware of any cases to date over the ownership of the underlying Web or Internet standards.
92. A considerable number of companies such as Apple Inc., Panasonic, Sony, and Hitachi all held essential
patents to the H.264 codec standard for video compression. See Valentin Spirik, H-264 List of Shame: All the
Patent Holders, Indiworks (May 5, 2010, 1:52PM), http://indiworks.wordpress.com/2010/05/18/h-264-list-ofshame-all-the-patent-holders/.
93. See Simcoe, supra note 2, at 162-63.
94. Dietmar Harhoff et al., The Strategic Use of Patents and Its Implications
for Enterprise and Competition Policies 4, Final Report Tender for No ENTR/05/82, (July 8, 2007) (“A surge
in patent applications, ‘a patenting explosion,’ has been observed at the European Patent Office (E.P.O.) as
well as at the patent office for the United States of America (U.S.P.T.O) and other patent offices world wide.”).
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5. Dealing with the Challenge of Third Party IP Companies
Given that RF interoperability standards have a higher risk of exposure to third party
IP litigation than FRAND standards, governments, implementers, and users must adopt a
strategy to deal with this risk in order to maintain the openness of interoperability standards.
5.1 Defensive Patenting
One option would be to follow the lead of the open source community and adopt a
strategy of “defensive patenting.” In order to protect the openness of the Linux kernel, an IP
company called the Open Invention Network95
has a practice of acquiring patents relevant to the kernel and arranging royalty-free
cross-licenses with third-party patent holders in order to guarantee mutual patent nonassertion, in a kind of “outsized” Non-Assertion Clause. The company plays a crucial role
in maintaining the continued openness of the Linux operating system by a combination
of the carrot of a royalty-free license to essential Linux patents and the stick of patent
litigation.
If RF interoperability standards are to be defended in the same way as the Linux kernel, it
would require SSO participants, as well as downstream implementers and users, to develop
a culture of cooperation around IP management and filing patents similar to the open source
community. This is perhaps not inconceivable given the potential for open source software
companies to enter the market under a royalty-free licensing policy, who may well have
incentives as well as experience of dealing with such risks. However, as in the case of
NAC’s already discussed, pure IP companies and in particular, patent trolls, often have little
to lose by the threat of a counter-suit. For this reason, defensive patenting would only be
partially effective as a solution to maintaining the openness of interoperability standards.
5.2 Competition Law Remedies
Compared to the United States, the EU has taken a stronger stance on using competition
law to control the abuse of IP in the context of technological standards.96 In the EU
“patent ambush” case of Rambus,97 the EU Commission imposed certain “commitments”98
95. See Welcome, Open Invention Network, http://www.openinventionnetwork.com/ (last visited Mar. 17,
2012).
96. See Carl Mair, To What Extent Did the European Court of First Instance Apply the Essential Facilities
Doctrine in Re Microsoft (Aug. 20, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
97. See Press Release, European Union, Antitrust: Commission Accepts Commitments from Rambus Lowering Memory Chip Royalty Rates (Dec. 9, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
do?reference=IP/09/1897.
98. See Counsel Regulation 1/2003, art. 9, 2003 O.J. L 1/1 (EC), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:l:2003:001:0001:0025:en:PDF.
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designed to neutralize the deceptive conduct of the company, including granting “royalty
holidays” to licensees of the essential patents, as well as royalty caps on several others.99
In the earlier EU case of Microsoft, the Court of First Instance (now the “General Court”)
arguably applied the so-called “essential facilities doctrine” to grant a compulsory license
to certain “interoperability information” under FRAND terms to competitors in a derivative
market to which that information was essential to compete.100
The European Courts’ proactive stance on maintaining the openness of technological
standards might seem to be encouraging for the situation of third party IP enforcement over
an RF interoperability standard which we envisage. However, certain technical legal barriers
make reliance on competition law for a remedy highly uncertain in practice.
First, the essential facilities doctrine requires that the IP owner101 is in a dominant
position.102 Though this could occasionally be the case, third party IP companies may very
rarely meet this condition.103 Second, the pure IP company would need to have refused to
license the IP. In the circumstances we envisage, it is much more likely a third party IP
company would attempt some sort of ‘patent holdup’ against standard implementers: so
the problem would be one of ‘excessive pricing’ rather than one of refusal to supply. Third,
even if, as in Microsoft, the third party IP company is compelled to license its IP under the
essential facilities doctrine, such a license would most likely be on mandatory FRAND
terms, and would not be royalty-free. In the case of Rambus, where certain ‘royalty holidays’
were granted, this was on facts where the company concerned deliberately misled the SSO
by not disclosing its essential patent applications over the standard.104 In the situation we
envisage, the third party company would never have participated in the SSO so could not
be accused of deception nor misconduct of any kind. Furthermore, Art 31(h) of the TRIPS
99. See Commission Decision of Case Comp/38.636 – Rambus, 2010 O.J. C 30/15, para 49, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:030:0015:0016:EN:PDF.
100. See generally Case T-201/04, Re Microsoft v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601.
101. Furthermore, this analysis only concerns patents, not copyright. Copyrighted interoperability standards
are able to be reverse-engineered (though, admittedly, often with great practical difficulty) under EU law. See
EU Directive 2009/24/EC, Legal Protection of Computer Programs, art. 6.2, 2009 O.J. L 111/17 available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:111:0016:0022:EN:PDF,
in conjunction with EU Directive 2001/29/EC, recital 50, 2001 O.J. L 167, Harmonisation of Certain Aspects
of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32001L0029:EN:HTML.
102. See Mair, supra note 96.
103. A common misconception is that all essential IP rights over standards necessarily give rise to a dominant
position. However, Damien Geradin outlines that there are a number of potential constraints which limit an essential IPR-holder’s full discretion to maximize its royalties, such as “horizontal,” “vertical,” “dynamic,” and
“institutional constraints.” See Damien Geradin Standardization and Technological Innovation: Some Reflections on Ex-ante Licensing, FRAND, and the Proper Means to Reward Innovators, at 3 (TILEC Discussion
Paper 2006-017, June 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=909011.
104. See Case Comp/38.636 – Rambus, supra note 99.
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Agreement would likely prevent a competition authority from granting compulsory
licensing without providing the patentee with ‘adequate remuneration’.105 This would rule
out the possibility of compulsory licensing on royalty-free terms.
Given the above, once a royalty-free interoperability standard is successfully challenged
by a third party as infringing its patent, competition law can offer no remedy to reinstate
its royalty-free status. The most it could do would be to grant a compulsory license on
FRAND terms, as was the case in Microsoft. And as in Microsoft, this remedy offers
little in the way of respite for open source software suppliers utilizing the GPL-family of
licenses, who would remain unable to implement the standard.106
5.3 Patent System Remedies
In terms of remedies supplied by the patent system itself, the choices are considerably
narrower. If we assume that the third party IP company’s patents over the royalty-free
interoperability standard were not achieved by deception as in the case of Rambus107 or
by misusing the patent system as in Astrazeneca,108 then very few options are available
outside of outright patent invalidation.109 Patent invalidation, however, would depend on
the particular circumstances of each specific case.
Nevertheless, as in the case of the JPEG standard, patent invalidation in the context
of software-related patents is a promising choice of action. This is because the current
European practice110 of granting software-related patents is deficient in many important
105. It is still not exactly clear to what extent TRIPS needs to be applied by the EU courts. In Microsoft, for
instance, the General Court stated that Community law prevails over international norms, but went on to argue
that its judgment was nevertheless consistent with Article 31(k) of TRIPS—a provision that allows competition concerns to trump IP rights in some cases. In any case, the fact that the Court chose to make the IP licensed
on FRAND rather than royalty-free terms is perhaps indicative of the kind of licensing terms to be expected
in future cases involving anti-competitive behaviour absent misconduct. For further discussion of the relation
between TRIPS and EU competition law, see Sujitha Subramanian, EU Obligation to the TRIPS Agreement: EU
Microsoft Decision, 21 Eur. J. Int’l L. 997 (2010), available at http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/21/4/997.
full.
106. Krzysztof Siewicz, Towards an Improved Regulatory Framework of Free Software, (Apr. 20, 2010)
(unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Leiden), available at https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/
handle/1887/15276/Towards_an_Improved_242.pdf?sequence=3.
107. See Case Comp/38.636 – Rambus, supra note 99.
108. Case T-321/05, Aztrazeneca v. Comm’n, 2010 Gen. Ct.
109. The possibility of pure patent system remedies (as opposed to antitrust remedies) based on the equitable
doctrine of patent misuse—such as the above cases represent—would not be a good course of action in the EU
in any case. Firstly, EU patent laws are still jurisdiction-specific, meaning that pan-European remedies would
not be available. Secondly, the doctrine is still under-developed for use in standards-related cases, particularly in
the EU. For an assessment of the arguments for its use in such cases in the U.S. context. See Daryl Lim, Misconduct in Standard-setting: A Case for Patent Misuse, http://www.atrip.org/Content/Essays/Daryl%20Lim.pdf.
110. By “European,” it is here meant the practice of EU Member States patent offices as well as to a lesser
degree, the European Patent Office (“EPO”) generally.
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respects, such as prior-art searches which only involve patent databases and occasionally
non-patent literature.111 The cursory nature of these prior-art searches means that a great
deal of software-related patents are probably granted which are technically invalid,112
including perhaps those which may be relevant to interoperability standards. The UK
Intellectual Property Office’s on-going trial of a Peer-2-Patent programme—where patent
validity examinations are outsourced to interested external experts, such as open source
software programmers113—is just one policy which is being investigated to try to improve
the quality of software-related patents, and which could help in the long run to protect the
openness of royalty-free interoperability standards.
Indeed, perhaps only real policy changes such as this will really have any effect on
the risk exposure of royalty-free interoperability standards to third party IP infringement
suits. This is because the risks of third party IP infringement which we envisage here are a
result of SSO participants and technical committee’s collective inability to locate relevant
third-party patents during patent searches; and this, in turn, was due to the search burden
created by excess patent proliferation. If the search burden is reduced due to the systematic
invalidation of unmeritorious software-related patents by crowdsourcing prior-art searches,
then the patent system itself as well as royalty-free interoperability standards will be
generally more robust.
6. Conclusion
This essay has applied pressure to the notion that RF interoperability standards are
less innovative than standards adopted under a FRAND licensing policy. Companies do
have incentives to contribute proprietary technology to RF standards. These incentives
relate to the potential of network effects to increase the penetration of their end-products
incorporating the technology which can then be indirectly monetized by selling more
products. However these incentives do not apply to pure IP companies and some large
vertically-integrated companies, which an RF IPR policy may well discourage from
participating in standardization. Since these companies are excluded from RF standardsetting, they could pose a threat to the integrity and openness of royalty-free interoperability
standards in practice. This threat could be in the form of asserting patent claims against
111. The IPKat Blog summarized a presentation by Nigel Hanley from the UK IPO about software patents
prior art searches. See P2P; The Aftermath, The IPKat Blog, (June 13, 2011, 11:02PM), http://ipkitten.
blogspot.com/2011/06/p2p-aftermath.html (“Nigel Hanley from the UK IPO introduced the subject with an
admission that the United Kingdom’s Intellectual Property Office (IPO) primarily search patent databases and
only search some of the available non-patent literature. They do some Internet searching but not much. P2P is
about accessing that part of the prior art inaccessible to examiners.”).
112. In addition to concerns involving ‘patent quality’ (i.e., the issuance of invalid patents), commentators
have also expressed concern regarding the (broad and sometimes vague) claim construction of software-related patents. See in particular, for the an analysis of the situation in the United States, James Bessen & Michael
J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk (2008).
113. See supra note 111.
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implementers of the RF standards or by creating standard fragmentation. While defensive
patenting in the tradition of the open source community might offer a partial remedy to this
problem, it would require a more cooperative effort between all stake-holders who have an
interest in keeping RF interoperability standards royalty-free. Competition law remedies
would be difficult to rely on since although they may be able to exert some price control
on licensing fees and prevent outright refusals to license, they would be unable to maintain
a standard’s royalty-free status in the face of a valid patent, even if abused. To this end,
patent invalidation remains the only sure solution against a third party claiming that an RF
interoperability standard infringes its patent.
In the long-run, the openness of interoperability standards could only be maintained
with improvements to the patent system itself and some cap on software-related patent
proliferation. The UK’s current trial of Peer-2-Patent might well be an answer to this
problem on the policy level. In any case, if indeed royalty-free interoperability standards
are what governments, users, and the open source software community want, they will have
to be prepared to fight for them.
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